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This essay offers an overview of the relation between exceptionalism and 
American literature, with a focus on how this ideology has shaped both 
the production and reception of America's literary texts. It suggests, in 
particular, that exceptionalism bears a relation to the literature that is at 
once constraining and generative. The assumption that grounds the 
argument, and that is already evident both in the title and my opening 
sentence, is that exceptionalism is, precisely, an ideological formation. I 
say "precisely" with some irony, because both "exceptionalism" and 
"ideology" are among the more slippery terms in contemporary scholarly 
discourse. Hence it may be useful to specify at the outset how the two 
terms are used here. 
By "exceptionalism" I mean a way of thinking that, in Joyce Appleby's 
words, "projects onto a nation ...q ualities that are envied because they 
represent deliverance from a common lot" (419). In America's case, it 
does even more than that. It imagines the nation as both the surpassing of 
the past and the hope of the future - as Walt Whitman does in the 
following passages. At the end of "Song of the Redwood-Tree," 
apostrophizing the "lands of the western shore," he says 
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I see in you, certain to come, tihe promise of thousands of years, till now deferred ... 
The new society at last, proportionate to Nature ... 
Fresh come, to a new world indeed, yet long prepared, 
I see the genius of the modem, child of the real and ideal, 
Clearing the ground for broad humanity, the true America, 
heir of the past so grand, 
To build a grander future. 
American exceptionalisin is a doubly teleological vision, in which all of 
history prior to the formation of the Euro-American "New World" was 
pointed toward this formation as a goal, and in which that "New World" 
k n o t  simply a place, but a mission. 
This definition of exceptionalism stands in opposition to that offered 
by Seymour Martin Lipset in his recent book, American Exceptionalism: 
A Double-Edged Sword, where the term refers simply to "the ways in 
which the United States varies from the rest of the world" (17). I align 
myself instead with Appleby, who argues that "Exceptional does not 
mean different. All nations are different; and almost all national 
sentiments exploit those differences" (419). To exploit them is simply 
part of the formation of a national identity and self-consciousness - as, 
concomitantly, are the identification and study of a national literary 
tradition (see Ashcroft et a1 17). But American exceptionalism is not only 
the claim that America is different, but that it is unique, one of a 
(superior) kind - and generally that that kind carries with it a unique 
moral value and responsibility. 
By this definition, there are certain ways in which America is clearly 
different that in fact run contrary to exceptionalism as a faith. Perhaps the 
most obvious is our history with regard to slavery and race. In recent 
years exceptionalism as faith has undergone a revival in American 
political discourse; certainly it was one of the staples of Ronald Reagan's 
appeal to the American people. At the same time we have had the highest 
rates of murder and incarceration of any developed nation, and we are 
clearly distinct among the wealthy nations in gaps between rich and poor, 
in percentage of children living in poverty, and in our lack of a national 
health system. But these are not the sorts of distinctive attributes that 
count in terms of the political uses of exceptionalism. 
Rather, exceptionalism is an ism, an ideology that selectively defines 
the attributes of the nation in order to justify and celebrate it. If, indeed, 
as Lipset says, "The United States ... has defined its vaison d'2tre 
ideologically" (18), exceptionalism is a name for both the content and the 
process of that self-definition. Lipset quotes Richard Hofstadter as noting 
that, "'It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be 
one"' (in Lipset 18). Exceptionalism is at once the ideology that we are, 
and the fact that, as a nation, we are an ideology (rather than simply, for 
instance, a political entity or a place with a history). The literary 
implications and manifestations of all of this are discussed in more detail 
below. 
What, then, is "ideology"? On the one hand, in traditional Marxist 
usage the term denominates a form of "false consciousness" (Engels uses 
this phrase in his 1893 Letter to Mehring; see Williams, Keywords 127). 
If Appleby referred to exceptionalism as an ideology, I suspect it would 
be in this sense. On the other hand, "ideology" is often used more 
broadly, in a way that its proponents would claim (and I would generally 
agree) to be more theoretically sophisticated. This seems to be the sense 
in which Myra Jehlen uses it in defining the subject of her American 
Incarnation: 
when the European settlers saw themselves as q~lickening a virgin land, the modern 
spirit completed its genesis by becoming flesh in the body of the American continent. 
The ideology of this incarnation as it fulfilled Europe's ideal liberalism, and as it is 
represented, appropriately incarnate, in the form and matter of American writing, is my 
central concern in this book. 
(4, emphasis added) 
Jehlen later defines this ideology as "[c]onstituting what one thinks and 
talks with rather than about ... [rleaching down to levels of consciousness 
that are themselves mute - never told but retold inside consciously 
constructed arguments" (19, emphasis in original). The task of reading 
this "ground itself, lying below the cited grounds of thought" is one of 
"trying to see the limits of a language, and therefore to see what it denies 
as well as what it asserts." It "involves saying what the writer has not 
s a i d  (19, emphasis in original). 
This view goes back to Louis Althusser's notion of ideology as 
inescapable, as the very condition of thought, as what he calls "a 
representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
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conditions of existence" (162). We never stand outside ideology (though 
we may stand outside particular ideologies). Ideologies are not (or not 
primarily) the contents of thought; rather, they are its conditioning 
structures and figures. And they are not merely limiting (though they are 
that); they are also, and importantly, productive. Much has already been 
said by many writers, and something more will be said here, about how 
exceptionalisin is limiting. But I also want to suggest how it is 
productive; and particularly how it is so - often in somewhat unpredict- 
able ways - for American literature. 
Still, despite his enrichment of our understanding of the term, Althusser 
ultimately cannot dispense (nor can I) with a certain lcind of reinscription 
of the old idea of ideology as false consciousness. For him it takes the 
form of his reliance on the opposition between the imaginary and the real 
("a representation of an imaginary relation to real conditions"), an opposi- 
tion tinged in his discourse with Jacques Lacan's reinvention of those 
terms, but one that still carries with it strong traces of the notion of a real- 
ity from which ideology departs. A later move in his essay, in which he 
posits "science" (as in "scientific socialism") as ideology's other, has the 
same effect of aligning ideology with falsehood (171, 173). 
The point of this rather extended reflection is finally this: when I speak 
of exceptionalism as an ideology, I both do and do not mean that it is a 
"false consciousness." There are ways, I will argue, in which, at least in 
its mainstream versions, it is patently false, both because of what it 
actively claims and because of what it silently excludes. On the other 
hand, the recognition of those patent falsehoods may still come under the 
sign, or in the context, of exceptionalism as a conditioning mode of 
consciousness, as a representation of individuals' imaginary relation to 
real conditions. Those, for instance, who criticize the mainstream notion 
of America as the cradle of democracy by pointing out the nation's 
failures, injustices, and founding inequities with regard to race or class 
are, on the one hand, exposing the falsehood of popular exceptionalism - 
particularly the falsehood of the notion that America is the "land of the 
free." But on the other hand, at least in the case of canonical American 
writers - and/or of readers who interpret canonically (that is, according to 
the canons of Americanness in writing) - this critique itself pretty much 
invariably takes place within the framework of exceptionalism as a mode 
of thought. 
There are certain identifiable real conditions to which exceptionalism 
represents an imaginary response. They have to do with the fact that the 
USA was both the first nation whose hegemonic ideologies and 
institutions were more or less uncontestedly bourgeois, and the first 
major one to become "postcolonial" in the contemporary senses of that 
term. It was the former condition, allegedly guaranteed by the expanse of 
available "unowned" land, that made America seem the land of open 
opportunity and the place where the individual (white) man could 
perhaps, to paraphrase Ralph Waldo Emerson's transcendentalist imper- 
ative, build his own world (see Emerson 1020). It was a combination of 
the two factors (our status as both bourgeois and postcolonial) that made 
America seem the world's hope for the f~lture, for in becoming post- 
colonial we had also thrown off the burden of oligarchy. 
But exceptionalism was, nonetheless, not only an imaginary response, 
but a highly problematic one, particularly in two regards. First, there was 
an obvious contradiction between the ideology of exceptionalism and the 
material reality of a nation in which all were clearly not in fact equal. The 
white man's "own world" was built in significant part by the labor of 
Black men and women he owned, and the ostensibly free and classless 
opportunity allegedly guaranteed by open land was (or quickly became) 
more imaginary than real, and in any case depended upon the erasure of 
the Amerindians and their prior claims to that land. 
A second, and related, way in which the promise of American excep- 
tionalism was highly problematic was in its going beyond the political to 
the mystical, beyond history to destiny. Three things must be said about 
this strain of exceptionalism at the outset. First, it should be taken as a 
proof and a reminder that imaginary formations do have real material 
effects: the notion of "manifest destiny" was not merely an apology, but 
an energizing force, for American imperialism. Second, this sort of 
exceptionalism has done far more harm than good; the genocidal effects 
of the doctrine of manifest destiny alone demonstrate this, even without 
invoking such other ugly aspects as the connection between excep- 
tionalism and the eugenics movement of the early part of this century. 
Third, though no positive effects of such exceptionalism outweigh the 
negatives, it has also been positively productive - not only in literature as 
an inspiration for Whitman's democratic poetics, but also in other 
spheres for social critics such as Martin Luther King, who returned to the 
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notion of America as a potential promised land in eloquent and politically 
progressive ways. 
In terms of the cultural work it has performed, the metaphysical 
extension of exceptionalism may have been in large part a response to the 
fact that the United States was the first major postcolonial nation. Among 
the effects of this were that the new nation had no models for the 
development it had undertaken, and that it still had links of enormous 
tensile strength with the imperial power that it thought it had thrown off. 
In this light mystical exceptionalism can be seen as a sort of overcompen- 
sation - a hyperbolic attempt to establish om difference from the 
metropolis. And its persistence as a symptom indicates that America 
really did not get over Europe for a very long time (indeed, it is only in 
the postmodern climate of the utter forgetting of the past that we may be 
said to have done so: if one has no memory at all the question of origins 
ceases to matter). For one example of the persistence into modernity and 
modernism of our colonial past and our mystical compensation, and of 
how these things have been generative of American literature, consider 
William Carlos Williams's obsessive attempts to repudiate T. S. Eliot's 
old-world notion of the tradition, efforts that extend from Spring and All 
through Paterson and one of the greatest of exceptionalist texts, In the 
Amevican Grain, and all the way into "The Desert Music." Williams' 
powerful emphasis on the particularity and curative strength of the local 
ground gains its intensity in large part from the desire to repudiate our 
subordination to European culture. 
In general, the traditional canon of our literature constantly manifests 
and reacts to exceptionalist ideology, for two major reasons. The first is 
simply that exceptionalism has been an integral part of the way many 
American authors, like Americans in general (particularly but by no 
means exclusively white Americans), have imaged their nation to 
themselves. The second is, as Nina Baym's essay on "Melodramas of 
Beset Manhood" suggests, that exceptionalism has historically been one 
of the conditioning and gatekeeping principles of canonization in Amer- 
ica: traditionally, in order for American literature to be both literature (as 
opposed to just writing) and American (as opposed to just literature, or 
just British literature), it must bear the marks of this ideology. It need not 
unconditionally accept the most optimistic claims of exceptionalism, but 
it must be clearly locable in relation to this ideology's themes - and 
generally, if not always, to the white, middle-class, male who is the 
dominant subject of this ideology, as well. 
It must be emphasized that this is the traditional way of looking at 
American literature, rather than the inevitable way, because this way is 
now being contested, perhaps more vigorously than ever before - as is 
the entire discourse of exceptionalism. While I am not eager or even 
willing, as some Americanists are, either to give up the canonical works 
or to discard the notion of aesthetic judgement as one criterion for 
deciding what to read and teach, I think this contestation is extremely 
healthy, both from a literary and a cultural point of view. In terms of 
literat~~re it offers us more to be interested in, more texts to learn and to 
learn to love. In terms of culture it should offer us a deeper understanding 
of the historical and contemporary multiplicity of American life, and 
should help us to meet a future in which that multiplicity can no longer be 
papered over, no matter what those with a nostalgia for a homogeneous 
and homogenized, white and English-only America - a nostalgia for 
neverland - might prefer. 
One example of such contestation with a broadly historical focus is 
Appleby's "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Excep- 
tionalism"; for two examples of a more specifically literary contestation, 
consider Baym's now famous article and Annette Kolodny's essay, 
"Letting Go Our Grand Obsessions: Notes Toward a New literary History 
of the American Frontiers." The latter was recently published as the lead 
essay in Michael Moon and Cathy Davidson's Subjects and Citizens: 
Nation, Race, and Gender from Oroonoko to Anita Hill, a collection 
whose opening sentence claims that it "takes on one of the most vexed 
issues in American literary studies: American exceptionalism" (I). 
Kolodny's essay offers a new way of defining the "frontier" and its 
literature: a way new not only in its conception of what a frontier is, but 
also in its implications both for what texts it would include as canonical 
"frontier literature" and for how it would read what it includes. Kolodny 
(20) specifically rejects the conditioning assumptions of exceptionalism, 
assumptions that have valued certain texts for their place in a teleological 
account of America as the realization of European liberal ideals, while 
erasing others that suggest an other account (by which I mean not only a 
different account but an account offered by an other - by one who is not 
the subject of exceptionalist ideology). Kolodny's essay is an excellent 
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example of the way in which many scholars are trying to re-invent both 
American literature and American St~tdies. 
Until recently I had accepted the widespread notion that our mystical 
exceptionalism was in large part a consequence of what has been called 
"the Puritan origins of the American self." It can be traced back to 
passages such as the following from what is perhaps the most famous 
exceptionalist text in colonial American literature: John Winthrop's "A 
Model of Christian Charity": 
Thus stands the cause between God and us. We are entered into Covenant with Him lor 
this work ... Now if the Lord shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the place 
we desire, then hath He ratified this Covenant and sealed our Commission, [and] will 
expect a strict performance of the Articles contamed in it[.] ... 
... For this end, we must be knit together in this work as one man ... We must delight 
in each other, malce other's conditions our own, rejoice together, mourn together, labor 
and suffer together, always having before our eyes our coinmission and coininunity in 
the work, om coininunity as members of the same body. So shall we keep the unity of 
the spirit in the bond of peace. The Lord will be our God, and delight to dwell among us 
as His own people, and will command a blessing upon us in all our ways, so that we 
shall see much more of His wisdom, power, goodness and t r ~ ~ t h ,  t an formerly we have 
been acquainted with. We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us 
shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when He shall make us a praise and 
glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, "tlie Lord malce it like that of NEW 
ENGLAND." For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all 
people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have 
undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made 
a story and a by-word through tlie world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak 
evil of the ways of God, and all professors for God's sake. We shall shame the faces of 
many of God's worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us 
till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are agoing. 
... Beloved, there is now set before us life and good, death and evil, in that we are 
commanded this day to love tlie Lord our God, and to love one another, to walk in His 
ways and to keep His commandments and His ordinance and His laws, and the articles 
of our covenant with Him, that we may live and be multiplied, and that the Lord our 
God may bless us in the land whither we go to possess it. But if our hearts shall turn 
away, so that we will not obey, but shall be seduced, and worship other gods, our 
pleasures and profits, and serve them, it is propounded unto us this day, we shall surely 
perish out of the good land whither we pass over this vast sea to possess it. (179-80) 
It is no doubt the case, as Sacvan Bercovitch has argued (see 3-11), that 
Winthrop's description of the Puritans' covenant and of America as a city 
upon a hill - or, more broadly, that the genre his sermon exemplifies - is 
in fact one of the generative sources of exceptionalism as quasi-religious 
vision. But the time has come to ask what it is that makes this text, or this 
genre, canonical as literature? I do not believe that the answer lies in any 
inherently aesthetic or formal qualities. Winthrop is eloquent enough, but 
why this Puritan sermon and not others? Why, indeed, Puritan sermons at 
all, and especially why sermons of this sort? Bercovitch (6) agrees with 
Perry Miller in calling "the New England jeremiad America's first 
distinctive literary genre." But something becomes a distinctive genre 
only if its perceivers have an interest in distinguishing it as such. It may 
well be that there are many other patterns of similarity in texts of the 
colonial period that we could raise to generic standing if we had some 
reason to perceive those patterns as significant. In fact, to some extent 
that is what Kolodny has done in her redefinition of frontier literature. 
What, then, is it that males the "distinctive" elements of the jeremiad 
distinguishable against, say, the general background of biblical analogy 
in Puritan writing? Or against the general background of the European 
encounter with the New World? What makes the particular tropes and 
topoi of the jeremiad significant enough to delineate a genre? The 
answer, I would suggest, is that the literary canon itself was constituted, 
retrospectively, out of and in promotion of an exceptionalist ideology 
(see Baym 125-27 and Kolodny 20). It may be that Winthrop and his 
genre - rather than, for instance, Puritan biographies of "great men," or 
Amerindian texts that witness the encounter with the Europeans (both of 
which might be candidates for canonization as genres) -have stood at the 
beginning of our tradition basically in a kind of cultural nachtraglicheit. 
I would suggest in fact that canon formation in general operates at least in 
part in this fashion. If this is so, then we see that exceptionalism as a 
theme has become constitutive of what American literature is. At the very 
least, it seems safe to say that if the tradition had not itself been 
constituted by men who saw themselves as heirs to the Puritans and other 
exceptionalists - if, for instance, the first anthologies used in American 
literature courses had been edited by powerful critics who were also the 
children or grandchildren of slaves - the canon might have looked a good 
deal different. 
One notable aspect of the claim that exceptionalism has been 
constitutive for our literature is that it suggests that the canon has been 
determined thematically and ideologically, rather than formally or 
aesthetically (see Baym 125-29 and passim). This really comes as no 
surprise with regard to the American scene. While formal and aesthetic 
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traits or judgements are never free of thematic or ideological determina- 
tions, the disposition in America has been to see the former (the aesthetic) 
as fundamentally trivial, and as worth attending to only when redeemed 
by some higher seriousness; the "merely" literary or "merely" aesthetic 
or "merely" pleasurable isn't enough of a value to define literature. Ben 
Franklin, a great lover of reading, nonetheless says in his Autobiography 
that he "approv'd the amusing oneself with Poetry now and then, so far as 
to improve one's Language, but no farther" (511). He found it of value 
only to the degree that it served a utilitarian end, such as increasing one's 
vocabulary. It may be in defense against this view of literature - or half in 
agreement with it - that Whitman insists in "A Backward Glance O'er 
Travel'd Roads" that "it is not on 'Leaves of Grass' distinctively as 
literature, or a specimen thereof, that I feel to dwell, or advance claims. 
No one will get at my verses who insists upon viewing them as a literary 
performance, or as aiming toward art and aestheticism" (454). Thus 
American literature must be exceptional not only by being American, but 
also by being more than mere "literature": the latter is one of those rather 
effete European values that the new nation seeks to leave behind. 
Moreover, as Nina Baym puts it, "from its historical beginnings, 
American literary criticism has assumed that literature produced in this 
nation would have to be ground-breaking, equal to the challenge of the 
new nation, and completely original" (125). In other words, it had to be 
as exceptional as the place. This meant that no established standards were 
relevant to it, so that, to quote Baym again, "the early critic looked for a 
standard of Americannness rather than a standard of excellence. Inevit- 
ably, perhaps, it came to seem that the quality of 'Americannness,' 
whatever it might be, constituted literary excellence for American 
authors" (125-26). We need not rehearse all of Baym's argument here, 
but she offers an incisive analysis of how the category of Americanness 
(which is also the category of exceptionalism - what makes something 
uniquely American) came to exclude women authors. 
Of course, the specific exclusion of writing by American women from 
the canon of "American literature" mirrored the more general exclusion 
that the ears of 1997 hear (as the ears of 1776 generally could not), in the 
assertion that all men are created eq~~a l ,  and endowed by their creator 
with certain unalienable rights. This formulation from the Declaration of 
Independence, which was in the revolutionary and federalist periods just 
the sort of thing that was offered as evidence for the exceptional nature of 
America, glossed over two other major structures of inequality as well. 
The first is the racism that excluded people of color from the category of 
men not because they were a different gender but because they were a 
different "species" (or, in a wonderfully self-contradictory ideological 
formulation, a different "species of men" [see Gates 81). Looking ahead, 
we may note that the lesson Huck Finn has to learn on the raft is, 
precisely, that Jim is of the same species - that White and Black people 
share a coinrnon humanity.) The second structure is that of class; the 
notion that all are created equal is that the individual is, in essence, free 
of circumstances - implicitly that those born poor are equal to those born 
rich. 
This latter is a fine idea particularly in a judicial context: if one 
assumes that divisions between rich and poor are inevitable, it is a good 
thing - though of course never really the case - if they are nonetheless 
equal before the law. However, while the Enlightenment notion of 
individualism that this idea carries with it may have had a politically 
progressive inflection in its day (particularly in championing the 
bourgeoisie against the droits de seigneur), over time it has (as often 
happens to ideas) been repositioned as a conservative defense of the 
vested interests of the dominant class - now, 'of course, the same 
bourgeoisie whom the idea helped to liberate. As Jehlen summarizes it, 
The modern revision of identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had begun 
by projecting a new division. Countering the ineq~~alities of social origin, it deeded 
each man with a natal estate in nature and pictured him then entering into political 
relations voluntarily and freely. This ontological separation and abstraction liberated 
the individual from a net of social and political interdependencies and, by rendering 
him inherently whole and self-sufficient, empowered him to act upon the world on his 
own (and his own behalf). No longer defined primarily by family or class, a man 
molded himself, then the world in his image. (3-4) 
Despite its great usefulness in opposition to a European system of 
inherited rank, this idea has proved problematic in its application. For, as 
Appleby puts it, this way of thinking "promotes more than a rejection of 
the past; it perpetuates the fantasy that we can uncouple ourselves from ... 
our society's cultural coding" (427). In particular it assumes that class 
boundaries are completely fluid; indeed the false consciousness that the 
USA is a classless meritocracy has persisted against all the evidence to 
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the contrary. In suggesting that the individual exists apart from 
circumstances, middle-class Americans have all too often inferred that no 
matter what may be the accidents of one's birth, in America no one has a 
head start: hence the poor kid who remains poor does so not because she 
started the race on an unequal footing, but because she is slow - and 
probably willfully slow. This is part of the logic of opposition to 
affirmative action in America; the belief is that once legal and judicial 
restraints on equal opportunity were eliminated, the "natural" equality of 
all citizens was re-insured. Any governmental help to any particular 
category of citizens is then seen as unfair, no matter what historical 
patterns of discrimination might still be in force. 
I bring up the problems of race, class, and gender not only because 
they are now the common coin of cultural studies, or because they are 
among the major problems that are repressed in the simplistic, "false 
consciousness" versions of an exceptionalism that sees America as the 
home of equality and possibility, and the model for the world's future. 
They are also worth raising because these three repressions are them- 
selves highly productive of canonical American literature, a literature 
that becomes one significant site of the return of the exceptionalist 
repressed. This aspect of our literature picks up on the opposite side of 
the coin of being a chosen people: the promise of a special providence if 
we keep the faith is also the threat of one if we break the covenant, as 
Winthrop makes abundantly clear. In a more secular version, this way of 
thidung suggests that inequality in America constitutes a failure to live 
up to who we really, essentially are as a nation. Many of our canonical 
writers have been there to remind us of the tragic or ironic distance 
between America as dream and ideal - the dream of equality and 
well-being, liberty and justice for all - and the historical reality of 
America as place. In The Last of the Mohicans and The Pioneevs, James 
Fenimore Cooper may do his best to affirm an ideology of white manifest 
destiny, but what makes him still worth reading is always what is left 
over, the pall that is cast (and the textual tension that is created) by the 
consciousness of and conscience about the genocidal effects on which 
this destiny depends. In "Benito Cereno," Melville gives us a savagely 
ironic portrait of Amasa Delano as the prototypical white American, the 
naive man of good will whose racism simply will not let him see - and 
who, when he does see, reacts as the mirror image of the "savagery" he 
fears and loathes. Even more brilliantly, Melville positions the reader 
with Delano, enticing us to an identification with him by which we 
become implicated in his incapacities of moral vision. In Huckleberry 
Finn, Twain again shows racism to be the darkest blot on the American 
conscience and continent, the blot that puts all but the outcasts at odds 
with the positive potentialities of the natural scene. The Scarlet Letter 
examines the difficulties posed for the City on a Hill and its mission by 
the demands for freedom and self-realization, and the sexuality, of a 
strong woman - and the difficulties posed for her by the exceptionalist 
polity. In "The Birthmark" Hawthorne shows how the dream of 
world-malting and mastery over nature destroys the other and the 
possibility of love. "Daisy Miller" shows how class snobbery and allegi- 
ance to European hierarchic values can make the American man not only 
a poor perceiver, but a killer, and a violator of that which is "naturally" 
American. Absalom, Absalom! tells the story of the American intent on 
overcoming the classism he experienced as a child by carving his own 
world out of the wilderness, and of how he is brought down by his own 
failure to get beyond the strictures of racism, classism, and sexism. All of 
these texts - and they are among the greatest texts of our traditionally 
canonical fiction writers - gain a good deal of their force from the ground 
of American exceptionalism, from the notion that what is at stake in them 
is not just individual stories, not just a class or gender or race analysis and 
critique, but a failure of America: a failure to live up to our exceptionalist 
destiny. All of them, in varying degrees, invoke this destiny. At the least 
they are likely to do so by having a particular character who represents 
either "the American" or "America." In other cases, they rather explicitly 
refer to exceptionalist discourse. 
One of the most vivid examples of all is F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great 
Gatsby, which is also one of the strongest novels ever written by an 
American about money and class. Richard Chase (162-67) suggested 
some time ago that the force of this text is its staging of a confrontation 
between the hero of American romance - the questing individualist - and 
the traditional social world of the novel: the world of manners, morals, 
money, and marriage that is antithetical to the form and the hero of what 
Baym calls the "melodrama of beset manhood." It is because Gatsby is 
the exceptionalist hero - because he is the conscious amalgam of Frank- 
linian and Emersonian models of self-creation and transcendence of 
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I see in you, certain to come, tihe promise of thousands of years, till now deferred ... 
The new society at last, proportionate to Nature ... 
Fresh come, to a new world indeed, yet long prepared, 
I see the genius of the modem, child of the real and ideal, 
Clearing the ground for broad humanity, the true America, 
heir of the past so grand, 
To build a grander future. 
American exceptionalisin is a doubly teleological vision, in which all of 
history prior to the formation of the Euro-American "New World" was 
pointed toward this formation as a goal, and in which that "New World" 
k n o t  simply a place, but a mission. 
This definition of exceptionalism stands in opposition to that offered 
by Seymour Martin Lipset in his recent book, American Exceptionalism: 
A Double-Edged Sword, where the term refers simply to "the ways in 
which the United States varies from the rest of the world (17). I align 
myself instead with Appleby, who argues that "Exceptional does not 
mean different. All nations are different; and almost all national 
sentiments exploit those differences" (419). To exploit them is simply 
part of the formation of a national identity and self-consciousness - as, 
concomitantly, are the identification and study of a national literary 
tradition (see Ashcroft et a1 17). But American exceptionalism is not only 
the claim that America is different, but that it is unique, one of a 
(superior) kind - and generally that that kind carries with it a unique 
moral value and responsibility. 
By this definition, there are certain ways in which America is clearly 
different that in fact run contrary to exceptionalism as a faith. Perhaps the 
most obvious is our history with regard to slavery and race. In recent 
years exceptionalism as faith has undergone a revival in American 
political discourse; certainly it was one of the staples of Ronald Reagan's 
appeal to the American people. At the same time we have had the highest 
rates of murder and incarceration of any developed nation, and we are 
clearly distinct among the wealthy nations in gaps between rich and poor, 
in percentage of children living in poverty, and in our lack of a national 
health system. But these are not the sorts of distinctive attributes that 
count in terms of the political uses of exceptionalism. 
Rather, exceptionalism is an ism, an ideology that selectively defines 
the attributes of the nation in order to justify and celebrate it. If, indeed, 
as Lipset says, "The United States ... has defined its vaison d'2tre 
ideologically" (18), exceptionalism is a name for both the content and the 
process of that self-definition. Lipset quotes Richard Hofstadter as noting 
that, "'It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be 
one"' (in Lipset 18). Exceptionalism is at once the ideology that we are, 
and the fact that, as a nation, we are an ideology (rather than simply, for 
instance, a political entity or a place with a history). The literary 
implications and manifestations of all of this are discussed in more detail 
below. 
What, then, is "ideology"? On the one hand, in traditional Marxist 
usage the term denominates a form of "false consciousness" (Engels uses 
this phrase in his 1893 Letter to Mehring; see Williams, Keywords 127). 
If Appleby referred to exceptionalism as an ideology, I suspect it would 
be in this sense. On the other hand, "ideology" is often used more 
broadly, in a way that its proponents would claim (and I would generally 
agree) to be more theoretically sophisticated. This seems to be the sense 
in which Myra Jehlen uses it in defining the subject of her American 
Incarnation: 
when the European settlers saw themselves as q~lickening a virgin land, the modern 
spirit completed its genesis by becoming flesh in the body of the American continent. 
The ideology of this incarnation as it fulfilled Europe's ideal liberalism, and as it is 
represented, appropriately incarnate, in the form and matter of American writing, is my 
central concern in this book. 
(4, emphasis added) 
Jehlen later defines this ideology as "[c]onstituting what one thinks and 
talks with rather than about ... [rleaching down to levels of consciousness 
that are themselves mute - never told but retold inside consciously 
constructed arguments" (19, emphasis in original). The task of reading 
this "ground itself, lying below the cited grounds of thought" is one of 
"trying to see the limits of a language, and therefore to see what it denies 
as well as what it asserts." It "involves saying what the writer has not 
s a i d  (19, emphasis in original). 
This view goes back to Louis Althusser's notion of ideology as 
inescapable, as the very condition of thought, as what he calls "a 
representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
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conditions of existence" (162). We never stand outside ideology (though 
we may stand outside particular ideologies). Ideologies are not (or not 
primarily) the contents of thought; rather, they are its conditioning 
structures and figures. And they are not merely limiting (though they are 
that); they are also, and importantly, productive. Much has already been 
said by many writers, and something more will be said here, about how 
exceptionalisin is limiting. But I also want to suggest how it is 
productive; and particularly how it is so - often in somewhat unpredict- 
able ways - for American literature. 
Still, despite his enrichment of our understanding of the term, Althusser 
ultimately cannot dispense (nor can I) with a certain lcind of reinscription 
of the old idea of ideology as false consciousness. For him it takes the 
form of his reliance on the opposition between the imaginary and the real 
("a representation of an imaginary relation to real conditions"), an opposi- 
tion tinged in his discourse with Jacques Lacan's reinvention of those 
terms, but one that still carries with it strong traces of the notion of a real- 
ity from which ideology departs. A later move in his essay, in which he 
posits "science" (as in "scientific socialism") as ideology's other, has the 
same effect of aligning ideology with falsehood (171, 173). 
The point of this rather extended reflection is finally this: when I speak 
of exceptionalism as an ideology, I both do and do not mean that it is a 
"false consciousness." There are ways, I will argue, in which, at least in 
its mainstream versions, it is patently false, both because of what it 
actively claims and because of what it silently excludes. On the other 
hand, the recognition of those patent falsehoods may still come under the 
sign, or in the context, of exceptionalism as a conditioning mode of 
consciousness, as a representation of individuals' imaginary relation to 
real conditions. Those, for instance, who criticize the mainstream notion 
of America as the cradle of democracy by pointing out the nation's 
failures, injustices, and founding inequities with regard to race or class 
are, on the one hand, exposing the falsehood of popular exceptionalism - 
particularly the falsehood of the notion that America is the "land of the 
free." But on the other hand, at least in the case of canonical American 
writers - and/or of readers who interpret canonically (that is, according to 
the canons of Americanness in writing) - this critique itself pretty much 
invariably takes place within the framework of exceptionalism as a mode 
of thought. 
There are certain identifiable real conditions to which exceptionalism 
represents an imaginary response. They have to do with the fact that the 
USA was both the first nation whose hegemonic ideologies and 
institutions were more or less uncontestedly bourgeois, and the first 
major one to become "postcolonial" in the contemporary senses of that 
term. It was the former condition, allegedly guaranteed by the expanse of 
available "unowned" land, that made America seem the land of open 
opportunity and the place where the individual (white) man could 
perhaps, to paraphrase Ralph Waldo Emerson's transcendentalist imper- 
ative, build his own world (see Emerson 1020). It was a combination of 
the two factors (our status as both bourgeois and postcolonial) that made 
America seem the world's hope for the f~lture, for in becoming post- 
colonial we had also thrown off the burden of oligarchy. 
But exceptionalism was, nonetheless, not only an imaginary response, 
but a highly problematic one, particularly in two regards. First, there was 
an obvious contradiction between the ideology of exceptionalism and the 
material reality of a nation in which all were clearly not in fact equal. The 
white man's "own world was built in significant part by the labor of 
Black men and women he owned, and the ostensibly free and classless 
opportunity allegedly guaranteed by open land was (or quickly became) 
more imaginary than real, and in any case depended upon the erasure of 
the Amerindians and their prior claims to that land. 
A second, and related, way in which the promise of American excep- 
tionalism was highly problematic was in its going beyond the political to 
the mystical, beyond history to destiny. Three things must be said about 
this strain of exceptionalism at the outset. First, it should be taken as a 
proof and a reminder that imaginary formations do have real material 
effects: the notion of "manifest destiny" was not merely an apology, but 
an energizing force, for American imperialism. Second, this sort of 
exceptionalism has done far more harm than good; the genocidal effects 
of the doctrine of manifest destiny alone demonstrate this, even without 
invoking such other ugly aspects as the connection between excep- 
tionalism and the eugenics movement of the early part of this century. 
Third, though no positive effects of such exceptionalism outweigh the 
negatives, it has also been positively productive - not only in literature as 
an inspiration for Whitman's democratic poetics, but also in other 
spheres for social critics such as Martin Luther King, who returned to the 
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notion of America as a potential promised land in eloquent and politically 
progressive ways. 
In terms of the cultural work it has performed, the metaphysical 
extension of exceptionalism may have been in large part a response to the 
fact that the United States was the first major postcolonial nation. Among 
the effects of this were that the new nation had no models for the 
development it had undertaken, and that it still had links of enormous 
tensile strength with the imperial power that it thought it had thrown off. 
In this light mystical exceptionalism can be seen as a sort of overcompen- 
sation - a hyperbolic attempt to establish om difference from the 
metropolis. And its persistence as a symptom indicates that America 
really did not get over Europe for a very long time (indeed, it is only in 
the postmodern climate of the utter forgetting of the past that we may be 
said to have done so: if one has no memory at all the question of origins 
ceases to matter). For one example of the persistence into modernity and 
modernism of our colonial past and our mystical compensation, and of 
how these things have been generative of American literature, consider 
William Carlos Williams's obsessive attempts to repudiate T. S. Eliot's 
old-world notion of the tradition, efforts that extend from Spring and All 
through Paterson and one of the greatest of exceptionalist texts, In the 
Amevican Grain, and all the way into "The Desert Music." Williams' 
powerful emphasis on the particularity and curative strength of the local 
ground gains its intensity in large part from the desire to repudiate our 
subordination to European culture. 
In general, the traditional canon of our literature constantly manifests 
and reacts to exceptionalist ideology, for two major reasons. The first is 
simply that exceptionalism has been an integral part of the way many 
American authors, like Americans in general (particularly but by no 
means exclusively white Americans), have imaged their nation to 
themselves. The second is, as Nina Baym's essay on "Melodramas of 
Beset Manhood" suggests, that exceptionalism has historically been one 
of the conditioning and gatekeeping principles of canonization in Amer- 
ica: traditionally, in order for American literature to be both literature (as 
opposed to just writing) and American (as opposed to just literature, or 
just British literature), it must bear the marks of this ideology. It need not 
unconditionally accept the most optimistic claims of exceptionalism, but 
it must be clearly locable in relation to this ideology's themes - and 
generally, if not always, to the white, middle-class, male who is the 
dominant subject of this ideology, as well. 
It must be emphasized that this is the traditional way of looking at 
American literature, rather than the inevitable way, because this way is 
now being contested, perhaps more vigorously than ever before - as is 
the entire discourse of exceptionalism. While I am not eager or even 
willing, as some Americanists are, either to give up the canonical works 
or to discard the notion of aesthetic judgement as one criterion for 
deciding what to read and teach, I think this contestation is extremely 
healthy, both from a literary and a cultural point of view. In terms of 
literat~~re it offers us more to be interested in, more texts to learn and to 
learn to love. In terms of culture it should offer us a deeper understanding 
of the historical and contemporary multiplicity of American life, and 
should help us to meet a future in which that multiplicity can no longer be 
papered over, no matter what those with a nostalgia for a homogeneous 
and homogenized, white and English-only America - a nostalgia for 
neverland - might prefer. 
One example of such contestation with a broadly historical focus is 
Appleby's "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Excep- 
tionalism"; for two examples of a more specifically literary contestation, 
consider Baym's now famous article and Annette Kolodny's essay, 
"Letting Go Our Grand Obsessions: Notes Toward a New literary History 
of the American Frontiers." The latter was recently published as the lead 
essay in Michael Moon and Cathy Davidson's Subjects and Citizens: 
Nation, Race, and Gender from Oroonoko to Anita Hill, a collection 
whose opening sentence claims that it "takes on one of the most vexed 
issues in American literary studies: American exceptionalism" (I). 
Kolodny's essay offers a new way of defining the "frontier" and its 
literature: a way new not only in its conception of what a frontier is, but 
also in its implications both for what texts it would include as canonical 
"frontier literature" and for how it would read what it includes. Kolodny 
(20) specifically rejects the conditioning assumptions of exceptionalism, 
assumptions that have valued certain texts for their place in a teleological 
account of America as the realization of European liberal ideals, while 
erasing others that suggest an other account (by which I mean not only a 
different account but an account offered by an other - by one who is not 
the subject of exceptionalist ideology). Kolodny's essay is an excellent 
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example of the way in which many scholars are trying to re-invent both 
American literature and American St~tdies. 
Until recently I had accepted the widespread notion that our mystical 
exceptionalism was in large part a consequence of what has been called 
"the Puritan origins of the American self." It can be traced back to 
passages such as the following from what is perhaps the most famous 
exceptionalist text in colonial American literature: John Winthrop's "A 
Model of Christian Charity": 
Thus stands the cause between God and us. We are entered into Covenant with Him lor 
this work ... Now if the Lord shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the place 
we desire, then hath He ratified this Covenant and sealed our Commission, [and] will 
expect a strict performance of the Articles contamed in it[.] ... 
... For this end, we must be knit together in this work as one man ... We must delight 
in each other, malce other's conditions our own, rejoice together, mourn together, labor 
and suffer together, always having before our eyes our coinmission and coininunity in 
the work, om coininunity as members of the same body. So shall we keep the unity of 
the spirit in the bond of peace. The Lord will be our God, and delight to dwell among us 
as His own people, and will command a blessing upon us in all our ways, so that we 
shall see much more of His wisdom, power, goodness and t r ~ ~ t h ,  t an formerly we have 
been acquainted with. We shall find tliat the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us 
shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when He shall make us a praise and 
glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, "tlie Lord malce it like that of NEW 
ENGLAND." For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all 
people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have 
undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made 
a story and a by-word through tlie world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak 
evil of the ways of God, and all professors for God's sake. We shall shame the faces of 
many of God's worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us 
till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are agoing. 
... Beloved, there is now set before us life and good, death and evil, in that we are 
commanded this day to love tlie Lord our God, and to love one another, to walk in His 
ways and to keep His commandments and His ordinance and His laws, and the articles 
of our covenant with Him, that we may live and be multiplied, and tliat the Lord our 
God may bless us in the land whither we go to possess it. But if our hearts shall turn 
away, so that we will not obey, but shall be seduced, and worship other gods, our 
pleasures and profits, and serve them, it is propounded unto us this day, we shall surely 
perish out of the good land whither we pass over this vast sea to possess it. (179-80) 
It is no doubt the case, as Sacvan Bercovitch has argued (see 3-11), that 
Winthrop's description of the Puritans' covenant and of America as a city 
upon a hill - or, more broadly, that the genre his sermon exemplifies - is 
in fact one of the generative sources of exceptionalism as quasi-religious 
vision. But the time has come to ask what it is that makes this text, or this 
genre, canonical as literature? I do not believe that the answer lies in any 
inherently aesthetic or formal qualities. Winthrop is eloquent enough, but 
why this Puritan sermon and not others? Why, indeed, Puritan sermons at 
all, and especially why sermons of this sort? Bercovitch (6) agrees with 
Perry Miller in calling "the New England jeremiad America's first 
distinctive literary genre." But something becomes a distinctive genre 
only if its perceivers have an interest in distinguishing it as such. It may 
well be that there are many other patterns of similarity in texts of the 
colonial period that we could raise to generic standing if we had some 
reason to perceive those patterns as significant. In fact, to some extent 
that is what Kolodny has done in her redefinition of frontier literature. 
What, then, is it that males the "distinctive" elements of the jeremiad 
distinguishable against, say, the general background of biblical analogy 
in Puritan writing? Or against the general background of the European 
encounter with the New World? What makes the particular tropes and 
topoi of the jeremiad significant enough to delineate a genre? The 
answer, I would suggest, is that the literary canon itself was constituted, 
retrospectively, out of and in promotion of an exceptionalist ideology 
(see Baym 125-27 and Kolodny 20). It may be that Winthrop and his 
genre - rather than, for instance, Puritan biographies of "great men," or 
Amerindian texts that witness the encounter with the Europeans (both of 
which might be candidates for canonization as genres) -have stood at the 
beginning of our tradition basically in a kind of cultural nachtraglicheit. 
I would suggest in fact that canon formation in general operates at least in 
part in this fashion. If this is so, then we see that exceptionalism as a 
theme has become constitutive of what American literature is. At the very 
least, it seems safe to say that if the tradition had not itself been 
constituted by men who saw themselves as heirs to the Puritans and other 
exceptionalists - if, for instance, the first anthologies used in American 
literature courses had been edited by powerful critics who were also the 
children or grandchildren of slaves - the canon might have looked a good 
deal different. 
One notable aspect of the claim that exceptionalism has been 
constitutive for our literature is that it suggests that the canon has been 
determined thematically and ideologically, rather than formally or 
aesthetically (see Baym 125-29 and passim). This really comes as no 
surprise with regard to the American scene. While formal and aesthetic 
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traits or judgements are never free of thematic or ideological determina- 
tions, the disposition in America has been to see the former (the aesthetic) 
as fundamentally trivial, and as worth attending to only when redeemed 
by some higher seriousness; the "merely" literary or "merely" aesthetic 
or "merely" pleasurable isn't enough of a value to define literature. Ben 
Franklin, a great lover of reading, nonetheless says in his Autobiography 
that he "approv'd the amusing oneself with Poetry now and then, so far as 
to improve one's Language, but no farther" (511). He found it of value 
only to the degree that it served a utilitarian end, such as increasing one's 
vocabulary. It may be in defense against this view of literature - or half in 
agreement with it - that Whitman insists in "A Backward Glance O'er 
Travel'd Roads" that "it is not on 'Leaves of Grass' distinctively as 
literature, or a specimen thereof, that I feel to dwell, or advance claims. 
No one will get at my verses who insists upon viewing them as a literary 
performance, or as aiming toward art and aestheticism" (454). Thus 
American literature must be exceptional not only by being American, but 
also by being more than mere "literature": the latter is one of those rather 
effete European values that the new nation seeks to leave behind. 
Moreover, as Nina Baym puts it, "from its historical beginnings, 
American literary criticism has assumed that literature produced in this 
nation would have to be ground-breaking, equal to the challenge of the 
new nation, and completely original" (125). In other words, it had to be 
as exceptional as the place. This meant that no established standards were 
relevant to it, so that, to quote Baym again, "the early critic looked for a 
standard of Americannness rather than a standard of excellence. Inevit- 
ably, perhaps, it came to seem that the quality of 'Americannness,' 
whatever it might be, constituted literary excellence for American 
authors" (125-26). We need not rehearse all of Baym's argument here, 
but she offers an incisive analysis of how the category of Americanness 
(which is also the category of exceptionalism - what makes something 
uniquely American) came to exclude women authors. 
Of course, the specific exclusion of writing by American women from 
the canon of "American literature" mirrored the more general exclusion 
that the ears of 1997 hear (as the ears of 1776 generally could not), in the 
assertion that all men are created eq~~a l ,  and endowed by their creator 
with certain unalienable rights. This formulation from the Declaration of 
Independence, which was in the revolutionary and federalist periods just 
the sort of thing that was offered as evidence for the exceptional nature of 
America, glossed over two other major structures of inequality as well. 
The first is the racism that excluded people of color from the category of 
men not because they were a different gender but because they were a 
different "species" (or, in a wonderfully self-contradictory ideological 
formulation, a different "species of men" [see Gates 81). Looking ahead, 
we may note that the lesson Huck Finn has to learn on the raft is, 
precisely, that Jim is of the same species - that White and Black people 
share a coinrnon humanity.) The second structure is that of class; the 
notion that all are created equal is that the individual is, in essence, free 
of circumstances - implicitly that those born poor are equal to those born 
rich. 
This latter is a fine idea particularly in a judicial context: if one 
assumes that divisions between rich and poor are inevitable, it is a good 
thing - though of course never really the case - if they are nonetheless 
equal before the law. However, while the Enlightenment notion of 
individualism that this idea carries with it may have had a politically 
progressive inflection in its day (particularly in championing the 
bourgeoisie against the droits de seigneur), over time it has (as often 
happens to ideas) been repositioned as a conservative defense of the 
vested interests of the dominant class - now, 'of course, the same 
bourgeoisie whom the idea helped to liberate. As Jehlen summarizes it, 
The modern revision of identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had begun 
by projecting a new division. Countering the ineq~~alities of social origin, it deeded 
each man with a natal estate in nature and pictured him then entering into political 
relations voluntarily and freely. This ontological separation and abstraction liberated 
the individual from a net of social and political interdependencies and, by rendering 
him inherently whole and self-sufficient, empowered him to act upon the world on his 
own (and his own behalf). No longer defined primarily by family or class, a man 
molded himself, then the world in his image. (3-4) 
Despite its great usefulness in opposition to a European system of 
inherited rank, this idea has proved problematic in its application. For, as 
Appleby puts it, this way of thinking "promotes more than a rejection of 
the past; it perpetuates the fantasy that we can uncouple ourselves from ... 
our society's cultural coding" (427). In particular it assumes that class 
boundaries are completely fluid; indeed the false consciousness that the 
USA is a classless meritocracy has persisted against all the evidence to 
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the contrary. In suggesting that the individual exists apart from 
circumstances, middle-class Americans have all too often inferred that no 
matter what may be the accidents of one's birth, in America no one has a 
head start: hence the poor kid who remains poor does so not because she 
started the race on an unequal footing, but because she is slow - and 
probably willfully slow. This is part of the logic of opposition to 
affirmative action in America; the belief is that once legal and judicial 
restraints on equal opportunity were eliminated, the "natural" equality of 
all citizens was re-insured. Any governmental help to any particular 
category of citizens is then seen as unfair, no matter what historical 
patterns of discrimination might still be in force. 
I bring up the problems of race, class, and gender not only because 
they are now the common coin of cultural studies, or because they are 
among the major problems that are repressed in the simplistic, "false 
consciousness" versions of an exceptionalism that sees America as the 
home of equality and possibility, and the model for the world's future. 
They are also worth raising because these three repressions are them- 
selves highly productive of canonical American literature, a literature 
that becomes one significant site of the return of the exceptionalist 
repressed. This aspect of our literature picks up on the opposite side of 
the coin of being a chosen people: the promise of a special providence if 
we keep the faith is also the threat of one if we break the covenant, as 
Winthrop makes abundantly clear. In a more secular version, this way of 
thidung suggests that inequality in America constitutes a failure to live 
up to who we really, essentially are as a nation. Many of our canonical 
writers have been there to remind us of the tragic or ironic distance 
between America as dream and ideal - the dream of equality and 
well-being, liberty and justice for all - and the historical reality of 
America as place. In The Last of the Mohicans and The Pioneevs, James 
Fenimore Cooper may do his best to affirm an ideology of white manifest 
destiny, but what makes him still worth reading is always what is left 
over, the pall that is cast (and the textual tension that is created) by the 
consciousness of and conscience about the genocidal effects on which 
this destiny depends. In "Benito Cereno," Melville gives us a savagely 
ironic portrait of Amasa Delano as the prototypical white American, the 
naive man of good will whose racism simply will not let him see - and 
who, when he does see, reacts as the mirror image of the "savagery" he 
fears and loathes. Even more brilliantly, Melville positions the reader 
with Delano, enticing us to an identification with him by which we 
become implicated in his incapacities of moral vision. In Huckleberry 
Finn, Twain again shows racism to be the darkest blot on the American 
conscience and continent, the blot that puts all but the outcasts at odds 
with the positive potentialities of the natural scene. The Scarlet Letter 
examines the difficulties posed for the City on a Hill and its mission by 
the demands for freedom and self-realization, and the sexuality, of a 
strong woman - and the difficulties posed for her by the exceptionalist 
polity. In "The Birthmark" Hawthorne shows how the dream of 
world-malting and mastery over nature destroys the other and the 
possibility of love. "Daisy Miller" shows how class snobbery and allegi- 
ance to European hierarchic values can make the American man not only 
a poor perceiver, but a killer, and a violator of that which is "naturally" 
American. Absalom, Absalom! tells the story of the American intent on 
overcoming the classism he experienced as a child by carving his own 
world out of the wilderness, and of how he is brought down by his own 
failure to get beyond the strictures of racism, classism, and sexism. All of 
these texts - and they are among the greatest texts of our traditionally 
canonical fiction writers - gain a good deal of their force from the ground 
of American exceptionalism, from the notion that what is at stake in them 
is not just individual stories, not just a class or gender or race analysis and 
critique, but a failure of America: a failure to live up to our exceptionalist 
destiny. All of them, in varying degrees, invoke this destiny. At the least 
they are likely to do so by having a particular character who represents 
either "the American" or "America." In other cases, they rather explicitly 
refer to exceptionalist discourse. 
One of the most vivid examples of all is F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great 
Gatsby, which is also one of the strongest novels ever written by an 
American about money and class. Richard Chase (162-67) suggested 
some time ago that the force of this text is its staging of a confrontation 
between the hero of American romance - the questing individualist - and 
the traditional social world of the novel: the world of manners, morals, 
money, and marriage that is antithetical to the form and the hero of what 
Baym calls the "melodrama of beset manhood." It is because Gatsby is 
the exceptionalist hero - because he is the conscious amalgam of Frank- 
linian and Emersonian models of self-creation and transcendence of 
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circumstances; because he "sprang from his Platonic conception of him- 
self' (Fitzgerald 99) - that he intrigues Americans, and that Nick Carra- 
way, Fitzgerald's moralistic narrator, can declare Gatsby (despite his 
obvious corruptions), to be "worth the whole damn bunch put together" 
(154). And what gives Fitzgerald's novel its claim not necessarily to be 
the greatest novel ever written by an American, but to be the "great 
American novel," is its analysis of American society in light of the 
exceptionalist dream. At the very least, this is what makes its ending one 
of the most resonant passages in American writing: 
[Glradually I became aware of the old island here that flowered once for Dutch sailors' 
eyes - a fresh, green breast of the new world. Its vanished trees ... had once pandered in 
whispers to the last and greatest of all human dreams; for a transitory enchanted 
moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent ... face to face 
for the last time in history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder. 
And as I sat there brooding on the old, unlmown world, I thought of Gatsby ... He had 
come a long way to this blue lawn, and his dream must have seemed so close that he 
could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind him, 
somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the 
republic rolled on under the night . . . 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. (182) 
For a more recent ending, by a writer who speaks from a very different 
subject-position but who nonetheless invokes the same tradition, 
consider the last lines of Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye, with their 
assertion that the destruction of Pecola Breedlove, a young Black girl, is 
a failure of the land, and their clear indication that the failure of the land 
is the failure of its people: 
I talk about how ... it was the fault of the earth, the land, of our town. I think even now 
that the land of the entire country was hostile to marigolds that year. This soil is bad for 
certain lcinds of flowers. Certain seeds it will not nurture, certain fruit it will not bear, 
and when the land kills of its own volition, we acquiesce and say the victim had no right 
to live. We are wrong, of course, but it doesn't matter. It's too late. At least on the edge 
of my town, among the garbage and the sunflowers of my town, it's much, much, much 
too late. (160, emphasis in original) 
Like James's Daisy Miller, Pecola Breedlove is an innocent flower cut 
off by the failure of America. 
These two endings point strongly toward a key difference between the 
traditionally canonical sort of American novels on the one hand, and 
European - as well as many non-canonical or marginalized American - 
novels on the other. The difference, I would emphasize, is that the 
individual and social failures or tragedies in canonized American novels 
are rather consistently framed, by authors or readers or both, as failures 
or tragedies of the nation - rather than, on the one hand, of a particular 
class or gender or social system or, on the other, of humanity in general. 
Emma Bovary's death may be a function of the social system in which 
she lives, or of her nation at a particular moment, but it is not so 
specifically a failure of France as an ideological ideal (at least, I don't 
think it is). Dicltens's innocents may suffer at the hands of a class system 
or a legal system or a failure of common humanity and charity, but they 
are not the victims of England's failure to be England. Among American 
novels, Edith Wharton's The House of Mirth is as vivid a narrative as The 
Great Gatsby, and as powerful an indictment of class prejudice. It also 
grippingly exposes and criticizes the kind of sexism that Fitzgerald's 
novel only reinforces. Yet in the past Wharton's novel has not had as 
much resonance for American audiences as has Fitzgerald's. The factors 
that Baym analyzes as contributing to the exclusion of women authors 
have everything to do with this. But I think one of the most important 
factors is that the novel is not framed by the exceptionalist myth: in 
particular, we are not invited to experience Lily Bart's death as a failure 
of the nation. Part of the reason for this is that she is not made to stand for 
America - that is, for the land - as women in general, and women victims 
in particular, have been made to stand in the traditional, male-authored 
American novel (as Baym and Kolodny, among others, have pointed 
out). One of the benefits of getting away from the nationalistlexcep- 
tionalist requirement for American literature is that we will longer require 
this problematic metaphor in order to feel the tragedy of such a death. 
Another benefit, already suggested above, is that we are thus given works 
of American literature to love that we were not invited to love before 
because they were not "American" enough. 
Exceptionalist ideology also depends upon at least one other key 
repression besides those of race, class, and gender - one other whose 
repressed returns in our canonically critical literature. That is the 
repression of the materiality and resistance, the otherness, of nature itself. 
Historically the guarantor of all the boons that make America exceptional 
is free land, and the landscape is regarded as hospitable to huinan activity 
- as, in the ideology's most radical versions, eager to be used (and used 
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up) by and in human designs. Thus in "Song of the Redwood-Tree," one 
of his most troubling poems, Whitman has the tree, which is about to be 
cut, speak as follows: 
Nor yield we mournfully majestic brothers, 
We who have grandly,fill'd O L L ~  time; 
With nature's calm content, with lacit huge delight, 
We welcome what we wuought,for thuo~~gh the past, 
And leave the fieldfir them. 
For them predicted long, 
For a superber race, they too grandly fill their time, 
For them we abdicate, in them ourselves ye forest kings! ... 
To be in them absorb'd, assimilated 
(152, italics in original) 
A number of canonical texts could be cited against this one, as could a 
good deal of notable contemporary poetry. Consider, for instance, the 
pigeon-hunting scene in The Pioneers, where Natty Bumppo speaks 
passionately for nature against its victimization by the westward sweep 
of Euroamerican designs. Or again recall "The Birthmarkn with its cri- 
tiq~le of thc oe'rweening scientific pride that would "perfect" nature. 
Among contemporaries, the openly ecological writing of Gary Snyder 
and W. S. Merwin, among others, comes to mind. But perhaps the key 
text in this regard is Moby Dick, in which nature persistently remains 
other to human readings of and designs for (or, more accurately, against) 
it. Surely the bitterness of the wounded transcendentalist, Ahab, results 
from the "failure" of nature to live up to the exceptionalist promise. 
Surely Melville's portrait of oe'rweening pride in relation to nature 
resonates against Whitman's appropriation of the voice of the tree to 
celebrate its demise in favor of manifest destiny - as, more generally, 
Melville's cautionary tale sounds against the entire transcendentalist and 
exceptionalist command, as Emerson puts it in "Nature," to "Know then, 
that the world exists for you" (1020, emphasis added). 
Thus in many ways our canonical literature has served as part of the 
conscience of exceptionalism, and of the nation. This critique from 
within the ideology helps explain why our literat~~re may look highly 
political and subversive - as many critics, among the most recent of them 
Frank Lentricchia (241-43), have claimed - and why it may yet at the 
same time seem to be no more than what Nina Baym calls a "consensus 
criticism of the consensus" (129). Writing from the subject-position of an 
otherness (the feminine) that has been systematically excluded, indeed 
anathematized as an impediment to the exceptionalist encounter with the 
wilderness, Baym finds the political critique from within the tradition 
anything but radical: its problem is precisely that it does not change 
things radically in the etymological sense of "at the root." While it 
criticizes the material reality of America, it does not challenge the 
ideological paradigm. Interested parties can consult Sacvan Bercovitch's 
The American Jeremiad for another powerful analysis of the ways in 
which the energies of this traditional critique have "served to sustain the 
culture, because the same ideal that released those energies transformed 
radicalism itself into a mode of cultural cohesion and continuity" (205). 
I want to align myself with those who urge that we attend to voices that 
pose a more radical threat - voices of others who have not been heard 
before, and who do not subscribe, even rhetorically, to the exceptionalist 
ideology. It is part of the business of contemporary American Studies to 
help us hear them. Yet it's interesting how, even in the case of voices 
from the position of the other, those who seem to have the most powerful 
impact are figures such as, in the African-American tradition, Frederick 
Douglass and Harriet Jacobs, Ralph Ellison, Martin Luther King, and 
Toni Morrison, who do invoke exceptionalism. 
But we must not, in opening ourselves to others, cease to heed the 
voices whose critique come from within exceptionalism. There are two 
sides to what Bercovitch says: on the one hand, it is hard for any really 
radical critique to take place in America, because critique is so easily 
absorbed into cultural continuity, and thereby often neutralized. But the 
other side of this coin is that we have had a continuity of critique - an 
ongoing testing of our realities against our alleged values - and the 
effects of this have been in certain ways positive. The history of what has 
been, on social issues, a surprisingly conservative nation has been made 
more just (or at least less unjust) by certain critical uses of exceptional- 
ism to hold our ideological feet to the fire. The critique that comes from 
within exceptionalism (like that which comes from the Enlightenment 
liberalism with which exceptionalism is so thoroughly imbricated) is not 
now nor has it ever been politically or culturally or ethically sufficient - 
but at times it has been effective, where a more radical critique simply 
fell on deaf ears. 
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What is the future of exceptionalist ideology in an age of the economic 
globalization that characterizes late capitalism, and tlie "incredulity 
toward metanarratives" that, according to Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, consti- 
tutes the postmodern condition (xxiv)? Both of these forces, it would 
seem, should tend to make exceptionalism less a dominant ideology and 
more a residual one, in Raymond Williams's terms (see Marxism and 
Literature 121-27). And indeed, such a forecast has much in common 
with the vision of the future projected in the cyberpunk fictions of 
William Gibson (such as Neuromanceq Count Zero, Mona Lisa Over- 
drive, "Burning Chrome," "Johnny Mnemonic") - fictions that Fredric 
Jaineson sees as nothing less than a "distorted figuration of ... tlie whole 
world system of a present-day multinational capitalism" (37). In 
Gibson's world, as in our own as the latter is described by many theorists 
of the postmodern, in the economically most highly developed countries 
national and nationalist categories seem to diminish in significance in 
light of the transnational flows of information and capital. In Gibson, the 
individualist small entrepreneurs who stand on the margins of the law, 
such as the computer "cowboys" who steal data and money in Neuro- 
mancer and "Burning Chrome," have little or no sense of national 
identity, and no discernible relation to any national project. 
On the other hand, both theoretical accounts of the present and recent 
fictions of America's future also provide an alternative vision, one in 
which exceptionalism could figure much more prominently. In contrast 
to those who see the role of the nation as diminishing, Michel Foucault 
points out that "in contemporary societies ... power relations have come 
more and more under state control" (224). If this is so, it is certainly 
possible for an exceptionalist discourse to have a significant ideological 
role to play, both in support of and in opposition to this concentration of 
power as the latter occurs in the United States. On the one hand, it can be 
one of the ideological frames by which this concentration is justified: 
"America must be strong to fulfill her destiny." On the other, it might be 
enlisted in the service of those who, invoking the Boston Tea Party and 
other icons of the American Revolution, claim the right of the people to 
throw off the "yoke of tyranny." 
On a more specific plane, it seems clear that the forces of ideological 
reaction have grown radically in the last two decades: the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan, the growth of right-wing evangelical Christianity as a 
political force, the rise of Newt Gingrich and other young New Right 
ideologues, and the emergence of the militia movement are among the 
most visible examples. All of these developments are thoroughly 
imbricated with, and consciously trade on, various brands of exceptional- 
ist ideology. A fiction that projects these trends (rather than the 
globalization of capital) as dominating daily life in the American f ~ ~ t u r e  is 
Margaret Atwood's terrifying The Handmaiden's Tale. It is less difficult 
than it ought to be to imagine a f ~ ~ t u r e  in the grip of a fundamentalist New 
Right totalitarianism; in such a future, one suspects, the most egregiously 
destructive versions of American exceptionalism (the belief in a 
programmatically white America with a Manifest Destiny allegedly 
ordained by an evangelical Christian God) might play quite a prominent 
role. 
Nonetheless, despite this rather grim reminder of how destructive 
exceptionalisin can be (and has been), I want to end by returning to a 
recognition of a more ameliorative and productive aspect, at least for 
literature, of a positive faith in it. In one way it is pleasing formally to end 
on a note of affirmation. But my doing so is in large part a consequence 
of the organization (or disorganization) of this essay as it has developed 
in composition, rather than an expression of any final faith in or desire to 
recuperate the exceptionalist ideology. Still, having disavowed the 
meaning of such a pleasurable closure, perhaps we can at least enjoy the 
fiction of it. The greatest pleasures and values of a positive exceptional- 
ism in our literature, I believe, are to be found in the Whitman tradition, 
and particularly in the best poetry of Walt Whitman himself. Part of the 
reason for that is that Whitman took the ideology more seriously and 
viscerally - and literally - than any of our other significant writers. And 
by an act of sheer will and unbridled, erotic energy, he worked it into a 
vision that asserts the transcendence of difference and absence and even 
death. When Myra Jehlen discusses how America became the literaliza- 
tion, the "incarnation of the spirit of liberal idealism," and how "the crux 
of the matter is the identification of certain abstract ideals with the 
physical American landscape" (9, 12-13); when she discusses how 
"Americans assume their national identity as the fulfillment of selfhood 
(9), when she tells how "it is as an American that ... [the abstract 
individual] becomes not only singular but representative," so that "com- 
munity ... comes from within" and "it is by being autonomous that each 
104 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1997 
man thus connects to others" (14-15) - in all of these instances she does 
no more, really, than to gloss Whitman. Here, then, is a passage that 
exemplifies Whitman's declaration of the democratic vision to which 
exceptionalism led him. Would that it had led our politicians and cultural 
gatekeepers to something similar: 
These States are the amplest poem. 
Here is not mei-ely a nation but a teeming Nation of nations, 
Here the doings of men correspond with the broadcast doings of the day and night. 
Here is what moves in magnificent masses careless of particulars, 
Here are the roughs, beards, friendliness, combativeness, the soul loves, 
Here the flowing trains, here the crowds, eq~~ality, diversity, the soul loves. 
(243) 
This scene of "equality, diversity" is perhaps the nation to which Allen 
Ginsberg referred as "the lost America of love" when, in his "In a Super- 
market in California," he paid tsibute to Whitman as "dear father, 
graybeard, lonely old courage-teacher" (24). At its most positively 
productive, American exceptionalism allows us to dream that that 
America of love is not lost - and allows us to go to Leaves of Grass to 
find it again, at least as hope and ideal. What we need as a nation, beyond 
the exceptionalism that the rhetoric of my ending is unable really to go 
beyond, is to learn that courage, to find that love of equality and diversity, 
to give it an American incarnation. 
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